THE USA, THE EEC, AND THE GATT:
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
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I first became aware of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") on January 1, 1962 - New Year's Day - when
everyone else was sleeping off New Year's Eve parties. The fifth,
or Dillon Round, of periodic trade negotiations under the auspices
of the GATT - the first round in which the European Economic
Community ("EEC") had participated as a unit - had essentially
been completed, but President Kennedy had not formally signed
off on the result of the negotiations. Some time between
Christmas 1961 and New Year's Day 1962, Orville Freeman, the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, had sent a brief to the President,
urging him not to accept the outcome of the Dillon Round. In
particular, Secretary Freeman urged against acceptance of the
nominally separate negotiations under Article XXIV(6) of the
GATT, which were supposed to compensate outsiders such as the
United States and (at the time) the United Kingdom for disadvantages resulting from the formation of the customs union. Secretary Freeman warned the President that the EEC was creating a
Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP") that was protectionist not
only in effect but in objective. In his view, the United States, as
a major supplier of wheat, corn, and other products of agriculture,
had a great deal to lose from the CAP, and should assert its rights
- and its power - before it was too late.
On the other side, George Ball, the Under Secretary of State,
wanted to avoid a break between the EEC and the United States
at all costs. A break over agriculture, he feared, might well doom
the "bold new instrument of American trade policy" that
President Kennedy was to announce in his State of the Union
message a few weeks later,' a Trade Expansion Act designed to
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authorize and stimulate a new round of trade negotiations.
At the time, I was a junior member of the Office of Legal
Adviser of the State Department, but as Special Assistant I was
supposed to be ready for anything, at any time. This time my job
was not to become an expert on GATT, but to gather together
the various experts from Geneva, Brussels, and several offices in
the State Department and prepare a document in plain English
that would persuade President Kennedy to find in favor of State
rather than Agriculture.2 Under Secretary Ball, himself a lawyer,
thought a lawyer's brief, freed from the jargon of the GATT
experts, would do the job. Of course, Under Secretary Ball wrote
the final version of the memorandum put before the President.
My role was only to write the first draft.
The outcome was that President Kennedy sided with the State
Department. The Dillon Round concluded without an agreement
on agriculture, except for some vague reference to further
negotiations on the basis of previous negotiating rights.3 The
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was adopted in the fall of 1962,
authorizing the strategy of overcoming the potential diversionary
effect of the customs union created by the EEC by reducing all
barriers to international trade.4 On the whole, that strategy was
a success, in that the European Common Market did not become
a protectionist bloc - agriculture excepted. As for the CAP, it
formally entered into effect on July 1, 1962, without serious
challenge.
At the time, I knew too little, and like any lawyer, was easily
persuaded of the correctness of my client's position. Over the
years, as I learned more about the subject and moved from the
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role of advocate to the role of academic observer, I have often
wondered whether the State Department's position, and President
Kennedy's acceptance of that position, was right.
As a legal matter, the proposed challenge to the CAP would
have been fairly persuasive. The centerpiece of the CAP was the
variable levy, in effect a duty on imports measured not by their
price or value, but by the difference between their price and the
"threshold price" related to a target price determined solely by the
EEC.' Article VII of the GATT says that tariffs are to be based
on actual value of imported merchandise - the reverse of the
variable levy, which increases as the import price falls. Furthermore, under Article II of the GATT, duties are supposed to be
bound, or at least eligible to be bound, pursuant to negotiation;
by definition the variable levy does not lend itself to binding.
Finally, even if the variable levy and associated devices were not
technically in violation of Article XI, which (with some exceptions) prohibits quantitative restrictions, a policy aimed at
autonomy and indeed autarchy was surely contrary to the spirit
of the GATT.6
The CAP was clearly central to the European Common
Market, and the variable levy was central to the CAP. If the
European Communities (as they were then called) had to choose
between complying with the GATT and insisting on its design for
the CAP, one can well imagine that the CAP would have
prevailed, and the GATT would have been gravely wounded.
In any event, the challenge that Secretary Freeman wanted to
bring was never brought.7 It could certainly be said that in the
tension between GATT as a code of rules and the GATT as a

For a detailed and roughly contemporaneous account of the variable levy
system, see Kenneth W. Dam, The European Common Market in Agriculture, 67
COLUm. L. REv. 209 (1967).
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forum for accommodation of trade conflicts, the pendulum swung
in the latter direction. The GATT, however, grew stronger, not
exactly step by step, but round by round, each one coming close
to failure but achieving substantial agreement at the last minute.
The Kennedy Round (1964-67) began to address substantive rules;
the Tokyo Round (1973-79) (almost called the Nixon Round) took
on a larger agenda of nontariff issues and achieved agreement on
some of them; and the Uruguay Round (1986-94) took on a still
larger agenda, moving beyond trade in goods to intellectual
property, trade-related investment measures, and (at least in
concept) exchange of services. In each round, the CAP was a
major source of contention, and in each round the parties decided
at the end - the very end - to settle for a modest improvement
and not to risk sacrificing the greater achievements in other areas
for the sake of agriculture or principle.
All of this is well known. Yet, everyone likes to play "what
if... ?"' On one hand, the CAP of the EEC, which had not
formally entered into effect as of early 1962, became entrenched
and led to an ever greater misallocation of resources, as well as a
continuing drain on the budgets of all the member states of the
EEC. Moreover, there is no denying that the tolerance of the
CAP by the United States and other outsiders led to some
measure of loss of respect for the GATT as a source of law. What
ifthe United States had made a serious effort in 1962 to understand the CAP, and had insisted on regular negotiation of the
target price for wheat and feed grains, the major determinants of
the many elements of the CAP?9 What ifthe target prices had
been subject to international scrutiny each time a new member
state was admitted to the EEC? Would Europe's agricultural
system today be more rational, more efficient, more consistent
with the doctrine of comparative advantage?
On the other hand, would the maturing of the GATT have

' See, e.g., IF IT HAD HAPPENED OTHERWISE, (G.C. Squire ed., 1932)
(containing contributions by Winston Churchill, If Lee Had Not Won the Battle
of Gettysburg; Harold Nicolson, If Byron Had Become King of Greece; Andre

Maurois, If Louis XVI Had Had an Atom of Firmness; and eight other essays in
similar vein).
' As of summer 1962, France's threshold price for wheat was 66% above
the landed price for imports, and Germany's threshold price was about 106%
above landed prices. See GERARD CuRZoN, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL
DIPLOMACY 204 (1965).
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been frustrated before it really got started? After all, the growth
from a fragile forum for tariff cutting and tariff binding into a
full-fledged organization with rules, adjudication and enforcement
powers, and an ever widening jurisdiction, took more than thirty
years as it was. We will never know. The footnote to history
which I have described here, however, may serve as a reminder
that the development of the international law of international
trade has not been along an inevitable path. There were in fact,
quite a few forks in the in the road. A friend of mine advises:
"When you see a fork in the road, take it." That is what
0
President Kennedy did in 1962. The rest is history."
10

1 have not seen the Freeman-Ball contest for the mind of President

Kennedy discussed in any book or article, either about President Kennedy or
about the trade negotiations. See, e.g., JOHN W. EvANS, THE KENNEDY
ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 146-47 (1971); ERNEST H. PREEG,
TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS 39-56 (1970); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A
THOUSAND DAYS 84647 (1965); THEODORE SORENSEN, KENNEDY 410-12

(1965). Nor does Under Secretary Ball mention it in his memoirs. See
GEORGE BALL, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN (1982). The suggestion
that an opportunity was missed to tighten agricultural trade rules in the Dillon
Round before finalization of the CAP is made "with the benefit of hindsight"
in ROBERT L. PAARLBERG, FDXNG FARM TRADE 47 (1988), but without

reference to the debate within the U.S. administration in the early months of
1962.
As for Secretary Freeman, by March 1962, he had gotten the message,
though perhaps with a hint of uneasiness. In testifying in favor of the Trade
Expansion Act before the House Ways and Means Committee, Secretary
Freeman said:
The Common Market poses the biggest and most immediate challenge in our efforts to keep open the flow of our farm products to
foreign consumers....
We have gone about as far as we can go in our negotiations with
the Common Market under existing legislation....
. An important element of [the common agricultural] policy
with which we have to deal is a system of variable import levies....
This system can be used to promote a policy of self-sufficiency. This
is the root of our problem in negotiations with the EEC ....
From the point of view of American agriculture, we must be very
firm in negotiations with the Common Market, making sure we get
full value for every concession we make. Perhaps the biggest test of
Atlantic trade cooperation in the next few years is going tobe the test
of agricultural trade policy. . ..
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We must throw our weight behind those forces in Western
Europe who argue that heavy import duties will be detrimental to
their own economic interest.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 835, 84143 (1962) (testimony of Secretary of
Agriculture Orville L. Freeman).
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